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We analyze the effects of socially responsible investment and public abatement on 
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July 2008 1 Introduction
Socially responsible investment is a portfolio management style that does not only rely on ﬁ-
nancial returns, but also on non-ﬁnancial characteristics of the companies associated with the
shares in the portfolio. The notion nowadays is that many investors do not only care about
cash ﬂows, but also about how these cash ﬂows are generated. An investor might, for example,
abstain from investing in ﬁrms that use child labor or adopt heavily polluting technologies.
The modern investor thus distinguishes between “sin stocks” and clean investment opportu-
nities (see, e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk 2005). In this context, Fama and French (2005) have
recently acknowledged that there exists a “taste for assets”, as if the assets themselves can be
seen as consumption goods. The most common form of socially responsible investment used
in practice is straightforward screening, i.e. stocks of companies that “misbehave”–according
to some threshold measure–are simply eliminated from the portfolio. This style of invest-
ing has witnessed increasing attention and experienced large growth ﬁgures. There is ample
anecdotal evidence to support this claim. In 2005, for example, about one out of every ten
dollars under professional management in the United States was subject to some form of
socially responsible screening (Social Investment Forum, 2006). Also, the April 2008 issue of
the popular magazine Institutional Investor reports that U.S. investor groups have currently
ﬁled 54 resolutions on climate change, up from 43 resolutions just one year before. Many
resolutions call on ﬁrms to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions.
Socially responsible investment (or “green screening”) can serve as a tool in dealing with
environmental externalities. In this paper, we analyze the macroeconomic and environmental
eﬀects of socially responsible portfolio investment behaviour in the presence of environmental
pollution due to production. We are interested in how a traditional ﬁscal policy (such as
a public abatement program) interacts with socially responsible investments. In particular,
it is interesting to ﬁnd out, ﬁrst, whether these two types of policies are complements or
substitutes for each other, and, second, whether socially responsible investment has an eﬀect
on the transitional eﬀects triggered by ﬁscal policy. More precisely, we consider two shocks,
namely, ﬁrst, a change in the level of public abatement and, second, a change in the perceived
pollution coeﬃcient.
Our paper relates to the literature on “green consumerism” (Bansal and Gangopadhyay,
2003; Nyborg et al. (2006); Bj¨ orner et al., 2004), and it is a natural choice to push the types
of arguments made in that literature in the direction of “green investing”. Indeed, one of
the main contributions of this paper is to formulate a simple and tractable way to model
socially responsible investment in a micro-founded dynamic macroeconomic model inhabited
by optimizing agents.
There exists a huge body of empirical literature on socially responsible investing that is
particularly interested in the relationship between corporate social and ﬁnancial performance.
Two widely cited survey articles on this topic are Margolis and Walsh (2001) and Orlitzky
2et al. (2003). In contrast, there are far fewer attempts to analyze the eﬀects of socially
responsible investing in a theoretical framework. Heinkel et al. (2001) study a static model
with green screening in the portfolio selection (see also Beltratti, 2005). Their model is
similar to the asymmetric information model by Merton (1987). Dam (2006a) studies socially
responsible investment and corporate socially responsibility in a (static) general equilibrium
stock market model, using insights from Diamond (1967). In a dynamic setting, Kristr¨ om and
Lundgren (2003) present a partial equilibrium model in which proﬁts are aﬀected by “green
goodwill”. However, their model is not explicitly on socially responsible investment, since
their approach implies that green goodwill is channeled through the consumer goods market.
Dam (2006b) studies the role of socially responsible investment in a Diamond (1965)-type
overlapping generations model to capture the conﬂict between current and future generations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
Households feature a “warm-glow” environmental preservation motive in the sense that they
feel partially responsible for the pollution caused by ﬁrms in which they hold shares. In order
to induce the household-investor to hold shares, these “dirty” securities must yield a higher
rate of return than “clean” government bonds. From the point of view of the representative
ﬁrm, the warm-glow motive of investors acts as an implicit output tax. Through this channel,
therefore, socially responsible investment aﬀects the ﬁrm’s output and capital accumulation
decisions. In Section 3, we loglinearize the model and prove existence and saddle-point sta-
bility of the macroeconomic equilibrium. In Section 4 we use the loglinearized model to
conduct comparative dynamic experiments. The ﬁrst shock consists of an (unanticipated and
permanent) increase in the level of public abatement. Interestingly, this shock weakens (and
partially crowds out) the warm-glow motive of socially responsible investors. In the second
experiment we study the eﬀects of a permanent increase in the warm-glow parameter, i.e., a




There exists a large (and ﬁxed) number, H, of identical, inﬁnitely lived households. From the
perspective of the planning period, t, the representative household possesses a lifetime utility





where c is consumption, p is an index of the ﬂow of pollution caused by ﬁrms that the
household holds shares in, Q is the stock of environmental quality, and ρ is the pure rate of
time preference. Consumers do not fully internalize the environmental externality, however,
3they do experience a “warm glow” from contributing to the public good, as in Andreoni
(1990).1 In equation (1), Q represents the external eﬀect on utility whilst p denotes the
warm-glow eﬀect. The warm glow is channeled through socially responsible investment–see
below.
To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that the felicity function, U [ ], is
log-linear in its arguments:2
U [c,p,Q] ≡ lnc − β ln(1 + p) + ζ lnQ, β > 0, ζ > 0. (2)
This speciﬁcation of preferences implies that the intertemporal substitution elasticity for
private consumption is equal to unity. Furthermore, the felicity function is separable in its
arguments, a features which simpliﬁes the analysis considerably.
We model social responsibility by assuming that the household feels responsible for a
proportion of the “dirt” produced by the ﬁrms in which it holds shares. We assume that
there are two types of ﬁnancial claims in the economy, namely “clean” government bonds and
“dirty” ﬁrm equity.3 The household feels responsible for the share-weighted relative pollution







, γ > 0, (3)
where Y and ¯ E are, respectively, aggregate output and the total number of outstanding ﬁrm
shares. Furthermore, e is the number of shares the household possesses, so e/ ¯ E is the fraction
of ﬁrms owned by the invidual household. Finally, γ is a constant parameter capturing
the notion that production generates undesirable side eﬀects, e.g. pollution. The stock of
environmental quality, Q, features in the denominator, i.e. it is the Y/Q ratio that aﬀects
the agent. In its decision making, the household takes as given the paths for Y and Q. By
assumption, the total number of shares of companies ( ¯ E) is ﬁxed, so the household can only
inﬂuence p by choosing its share holdings, e.
The household can save by investing in shares or in government bonds (to keep matters
simple, there are no corporate bonds4). In this deterministic setting, there is no risk so bonds
and shares are perfect substitutes in the household’s portfolio. The household budget identity
is thus given by:
˙ b + Pe˙ e + c = W + d + rb − z, (4)
1Nyborg et al. (2006) provide a detailed discussion of the psychological motivation for this kind of behaviour
in the context of green consumption.
2We drop the time index, where no confusion can arise.
3Households assume that the government engages in clean activities, i.e. it screens out all socially irresponsi-
ble activities. The assumption of a single dirty asset simpliﬁes the analysis without signiﬁcant loss of generality.
The model can be easily generalized by recognizing heterogeneous ﬁrms diﬀering in their γ-parameters. In
such a setting, the dirtier ﬁrms will have a higher rate of return. See also below.
4If there were corporate bonds, we postulate that investors would treat them as dirty assets, i.e. as
equivalent to equity. Under this assumption, ignoring corporate bonds entails no loss of generality.
4where b denotes government bonds, Pe is the stock market price of company shares, W is
the wage rate, d is dividends received from ﬁrms, r is the interest rate, and z is lump-sum
taxes paid to the government. Labour supply is exogenous and equal to unity, so W also
stands for the household’s wage income. As usual, a variable with a dot is that variable’s
time rate of change, e.g. ˙ b ≡ db(τ)/dτ. In the planning period, t, the household faces the






where D stands for total dividend payments by ﬁrms. The dividend payout ratio is determined
by the ﬁrm and taken parametrically by the household, i.e. dividend receipts of the individual
investor amount to d = πPee.
The household chooses time paths for c, b, e in order to maximize (1) subject to (4),
taking into account (2)-(5), and some transversality conditions. The household optimization
program constitutes a non-standard optimal control problem which can, however, be solved
by transforming it. We demonstrate in Appendix A that the key expressions characteriz-
ing individual household behaviour in an interior optimum (with all assets held in positive
amounts) are given by:
˙ c
c
= r − ρ, (6)










a = b + Pee, (8)
where re ≡ ˙ Pe/Pe+π is the pecuniary rate of return on shares. Equation (6) is the conventional
Euler equation, equating the growth rate in consumption to the gap between the interest rate
and the pure rate of time preference. Equation (7) is the no-arbitrage equation for shares
and bonds. Intuitively, since β is positive, the individual investor demands a higher rate of
return on shares than on clean bonds (re > r), because the former give rise to undesirable side
eﬀects in the form of pollution. Ceteris paribus, the excess return depends positively on γ
and negatively on Q and the equity value per unit of output, v ≡ Pe ¯ E/Y .6 Finally, equation
(8) shows that total ﬁnancial wealth consists of bonds plus the market value of shares.
Since agents are identical, aggregate values pertaining to the household sector are deﬁned
in a straightforward fashion, i.e. C ≡ Hc, A ≡ Ha, B ≡ Hb, Z ≡ Hz. Each agent
5To keep the model symmetric, and thus to be able to employ the notion of a representative agent, we
assume that in the initial equilibrium each household has an endowment of shares equal to ¯ E/H. In the
optimum there will be no net trades in shares, i.e. e(t) = ¯ E/H for all t. As a result, optimal investment
behaviour will give rise to an equilibrium price of shares.
6Of course, for β = 0 the agent does not feel a warm glow eﬀect and thus does not demand an excess return
on shares, i.e. re = r in that case.
5holds the same amount of shares, e = ¯ E/H, and experiences the same warm glow eﬀect,
p = γY/(HQ). Aggregate assets satisfy A = B + K. The household sector is summarized in
Table 1 by equations (T1.1) and (T1.5).
Table 1: Main Model Equations
˙ C
C
= r − ρ (T1.1)
˙ K = Y − C − G − δK (T1.2)
W = (1 − θ)FL [K,H] (T1.3)
r + δ = (1 − θ)FK [K,H] (T1.4)





zH = rB + G (T1.7)
˙ Q = µ   (−Q + φ + ξG − ηY ) (T1.8)
Notes: C is consumption, r is the interest rate, ρ is the rate of time preference, K is the cap-
ital stock, H is labour supply, G is public abatement, δ is the depreciation rate of capital, θ is
the implicit tax (warm glow), Q is environmental quality, Y is output, z is the lump-sum tax
per agent, B is the stock of government bonds. Parameters β, γ, µ, ξ, and η are all positive.
2.2 Firms
There are many, perfectly competitive ﬁrms, using a constant returns to scale technology to
produce a single homogeneous good. We argue on the basis of the representative ﬁrm. To
keep the model as simple as possible, we abstract from corporate debt (so that ﬁnancing is
by retained earnings only).
Gross operating proﬁt of the ﬁrm is denoted by Π and deﬁned as:
Π ≡ F [K,L] − WL, (9)
where K is the physical capital stock, L is labour demand, and F [K,L] ≡ KαL1−α is a Cobb-
Douglas (constant returns to scale) production function. Corporate proﬁt is either paid out
to household-investors in the form of dividends, D, or kept in the form of retained earnings,
RE:
Π = D + RE. (10)
6The capital accumulation identity is given by:
˙ K = I − δK, (11)
where I is gross investment, δ is the depreciation rate, and ˙ K (τ) ≡ dK/dτ is net investment.














We assume that parameters are such that θ is positive but less than one (0 < θ < 1). In
equation (12), θY can be interpreted as a negative dividend (undesirable pollution) resulting
from the ﬁrm’s production activities.





[1 − θ(τ)]F [K (τ),L(τ)] − W (τ)L(τ) − I (τ)
 
eR(t,τ)dτ, (14)






is the interest factor. The ﬁrm chooses optimal time paths
for K, I, and L in order to maximize (14), subject to the accumulation identity (11), the
path of implicit taxes, and taking as given the initial capital stock, K (t). The key ﬁrst-order
necessary conditions for an interior solution can be written as follows:
W = (1 − θ)FL [K,L], (15)
r + δ = (1 − θ)FK [K,L], (16)
and it follows that V (t) = K (t). Equations (15)-(16) are the standard rental expressions for
labour and capital.
3 Model summary
The key expressions of the model are collected in Table 1. Equation (T1.1) is the aggregate
consumption Euler equation. Equation (T1.2) is the macroeconomic capital accumulation
expression, showing that the net change in the capital stock, ˙ K, equals net output, Y − δK,
minus the sum of private consumption and public abatement, C+G. Equations (T1.3)-(T1.4)
just restate the factor rental expressions (15)-(16), with labour market clearing, L = H, im-
posed. Equation (T1.5) is the aggregate production function. Equation (T1.6) expresses the
implicit tax faced by ﬁrms, θ, in terms of macro variables, C, Y , and Q. It is obtained
by rewriting the no-arbitrage equation (7) somewhat. It is easy to verify that ∂θ/∂Q < 0,
7∂θ/∂Y < 0, ∂θ/∂C > 0, and ∂θ/∂γ > 0. Equation (T1.7) is the static government budget
constraint, showing that the lump-sum tax revenue (left-hand side) equals total government
spending, consisting of interest payments on existing government debt plus abatement expen-
diture (right-hand side). Below we assume B to be ﬁxed, and consider G to be an exogenous
policy variable under government control. Throughout the paper, the lump-sum tax is as-
sumed to balance the budget. Finally, equation (T1.8) show the dynamic expression for the
stock of environmental quality. Following John and Pecchenino (1994) and Bovenberg and
Heijdra (1998), we assume that nature features a regenerative capacity and, for given values of
Y and G, slowly settles into a steady-state quality level, ˆ Q = φ+ξG−ηˆ Y , where hats denote
steady-state values. We assume that ˆ Q is positive. The parameter µ measures the speed of
regeneration, which we take to be ﬁnite in the general case. Occasionally, however, we shall
consider the special case of µ → ∞, in which case adjustment in environmental quality is
instantaneous, i.e. Q has the ﬂow dimension. To summarize, the endogenous variables of the
model are C, Y , K, Q, W, r, θ, and z. The exogenous variables are H, B, and G.
In order to further investigate the model properties and to prepare for the comparative
dynamic analyses conducted in the next section, we log-linearize the model around an initial
steady state–see Table 2. The deﬁnitions of the variables and shares parameters are also
stated at the bottom of Table 2. The stability analysis depends on the speed of adjustment
of nature, µ.
Table 2: Log-linearized Model
˙ ˜ C = ρ˜ r (T2.1)
˙ ˜ K = ˆ y  
 
˜ Y − ωC ˜ C − ωG ˜ G − ωI ˜ K
 
(T2.2)
˜ W = α ˜ K −
ˆ θ




˜ r = −(1 − α) ˜ K −
ˆ θ
1 − ˆ θ
˜ θ (T2.4)
˜ Y = α ˜ K (T2.5)
˜ θ = ˜ C − (1 − ωQ) ˜ Y − ωQ ˜ Q + ωQ˜ γ (T2.6)
˜ Z = ωB˜ r + ωG ˜ G (T2.7)
˙ ˜ Q = µ  
 
− ˜ Q + εG ˜ G − εY ˜ Y
 
(T2.8)
Notes. (i) Variables are deﬁned as follows: ˙ ˜ x(t) ≡ d˙ x(t)/ˆ x and ˜ x(t) ≡ dx(t)/ˆ x. Exception:
˜ Z ≡ Hdz/ˆ Y . (ii) Steady-state shares are deﬁned as: ωC ≡ ˆ C/ˆ Y , ωG ≡ G/ˆ Y , ˆ y ≡ ˆ Y / ˆ K, ωB ≡
ρB/ˆ Y , ωQ ≡ H ˆ Q/[H ˆ Q + γ ˆ Y ], εG ≡ ξG/ ˆ Q, εY ≡ ηˆ Y / ˆ Q. (iii) Relationship between shares: ωI =
δ/ˆ y = 1 − ωC − ωG, ρ + δ = α(1 − ˆ θ)ˆ y, ˆ θ = βωC(1 − ωQ), α − ωI = (ρ + δˆ θ)/[(1 − ˆ θ)ˆ y] > 0.
8Q as a ﬂow Under the ﬂow interpretation, we set µ → ∞ and ﬁnd that the quality of
nature, Q, adjusts immediately. The dynamical system for consumption and the capital
stock can be written in a simple matrix expressions as:
  ˙ ˜ C
˙ ˜ K
 






where the Jacobian matrix, ∆, possessing typical elements δij, is deﬁned as:
∆ ≡
 
−αˆ yˆ θ −αˆ y
 
(1 − α)(1 − ˆ θ) − αˆ θ[1 − ωQ (1 + εY )]
 
−ˆ yωC ˆ y (α − ωI)
 
, (18)
and the shock vector is given by:
Γ ≡
 
−αˆ yˆ θωQ[˜ γ − εG ˜ G]
−ˆ yωG ˜ G
 
(19)
The stability analysis proceeds as follows. It is easy to show that the trace of ∆ is positive:
tr∆ = ˆ y
 
(1 − ˆ θ)α − ωI
 
= ρ > 0, (20)
suggesting that there is at least one positive characteristic root. The determinant of ∆ is
equal to:
|∆| = −αˆ y2
 
ˆ θ(α − ωI) + ωC
 
1 − α − ˆ θ + αˆ θωQ (1 + εY )
  
. (21)
In the absence of the warm-glow eﬀect (ˆ θ = 0), the determinant is negative and the model is
saddle-point stable, i.e. it possesses one positive (unstable) root, say λ1 > 0, and one negative
(stable) root, say −λ2 < 0. The roots satisfy the usual relationships, i.e. λ1 = ρ + λ2 and
|∆| = −λ1λ2. With an operative warm-glow eﬀect the implicit tax is positive, and saddle-
point stability is not guaranteed for all parameter values. Since α > ωI, however, a very mild
suﬃcient condition for saddle-point stability is that α + ˆ θ < 1, which we assume from here
on.7 To summarize, the model is saddle-point stable, with consumption and the capital stock
acting as, respectively, the non-predetermined (“jumping”) variable and the predetermined
(“sticky”) variable.
Q as a stock Under the stock interpretation, µ is ﬁnite and the quality of nature only
changes gradually over time. As a result, there are now three dynamic variables, namely C,
7Recall that α represents the capital share of national income, for which a = 1/3 is a plausible value. The
implicit tax, though positive, is likely to be quite small, easily satisfying the suﬃcient condition.
9K, and Q. Saddle-point stability now requires there to be two stable roots, and one unstable


















 + ¯ Γ, (22)






−αˆ yˆ θ −αˆ y
 
(1 − α)(1 − ˆ θ) − αˆ θ(1 − ωQ)
 
αˆ yˆ θωQ










−αˆ yˆ θωQ˜ γ





We ﬁnd that tr¯ ∆ = ρ − µ and
   ¯ ∆
    = −µ   |∆| > 0, where we have used the fact that |∆| < 0.
We conclude that the model is saddle-point stable and write the characteristic roots as ¯ λ1 > 0,
−¯ λ2 < 0, and −¯ λ3 < 0.8
4 Comparative Dynamics
In this section we use the loglinearized model of Table 2 to investigate the impact, transi-
tional, and long-run eﬀects of two environmental shocks. In the ﬁrst subsection we study
a tax-ﬁnanced increase in the level of public abatement, whilst in the second subsection we
demonstrate what happens if there is an once-oﬀ increase in the warm-glow parameter, γ.
For both shocks, we show the eﬀects under both the ﬂow and the stock interpretation of
environmental quality.
4.1 Public abatement
Starting from an initial steady-state equilibrium, the economy is perturbed by an unantic-
ipated and permanent increase in the level of public abatement. The government uses the
lump-sum tax to balance its budget.
4.1.1 Flow interpretation
Under the ﬂow interpretation of environmental quality, there are only two state variables and
a convenient graphical representation of the model is available. Indeed, by using equations
8The Routh-Hurwitz condition ensures that the alternative case, with three positive characteristic roots, is











Figure 1: Phase Diagram
(17)-(19) and setting ˜ G > 0 and ˜ γ = 0 we ﬁnd two equilibrium loci:
˜ C = −
δ12
δ11
˜ K + εGωQ ˜ G, (25)







where δij are the typical elements of ∆ (given in (18) above) and we recall that δ11 < 0,
δ12 < 0, δ21 < 0, δ22 > 0, α > ωI, and |∆| ≡ δ11δ22 − δ12δ21 < 0. Equation (25) depicts
combinations for ˜ C and ˜ K, for which ˙ ˜ C = 0. This is the consumption equilibrium line, CE0,
in Figure 1. This line is downward sloping, and points to the right (left) of the line are
consistent with a falling (rising) consumption proﬁle, i.e. ˙ ˜ C < 0 (> 0)–see the vertical arrows
in Figure 1.
Equation (26) gives combinations of ˜ C and ˜ K, for which ˙ ˜ K = 0. This is the capital stock
equilibrium line, KE0, in Figure 1. This line is upward sloping, and points above (below) the
line are consistent with a falling (rising) capital stock, i.e. ˙ ˜ K < 0 (> 0)–see the horizontal
arrows in Figure 1. The conﬁguration of arrows conﬁrms saddle-point stability: the initial
equilibrium is at E0 and the saddle path is denoted by SP0.
An increase in public abatement shifts both curves in Figure 2. First, the CE curve
shifts to the right from CE0 to CE1. Intuitively, following the abatement shock consumption














Figure 2: Increase in Public Abatement
tax, ˆ θ.9 Second, the abatement shock reduces the amount of resources available for private
consumption and capital accumulation, thus shifting the KE line down, say from KE0 to KE1
in Figure 2. In the long run, the equilibrium shifts from E0 to E1, consumption decreases
and the capital stock increases. The eﬀect on environmental quality is ambiguous, because
the capital stock (and thus output) increases the ﬂow of pollution which may dominate the
abatement eﬀect.
At impact, the capital stock is predetermined and consumption falls as a result of the tax
increase. This is the move from E0 to A on the new saddle path, SP1. At point A, the interest
rate exceeds the rate of time preference because the increase in public abatement decreases the
implicit warm-glow tax. This means that consumption follows an upward sloping time proﬁle
during transition. At the same time, the reduction in consumption more than compensates
for the increase in public abatement, thus resulting in net capital accumulation. During
transition, the economy proceeds along the saddle path from point A to the new equilibrium
at E1.
9Recall that ˆ r = ρ implies that ρ + δ = α(1 − θ)(H/ ˆ K)
1−α, from which the result mentioned in the text
follows readily.
124.1.2 Stock interpretation
Under the stock interpretation, the long-run eﬀects are exactly the same as under the ﬂow
interpretation. There are, however, nontrivial diﬀerences in the adjustment paths toward the
new equilibrium. Appendix C contains analytical expressions for the transition paths. In
order to visualise the transition paths for the diﬀerent variables, we calibrate the model using
plausible parameter values. To keep things simple, we assume that the production function
is of the Cobb-Douglas form, i.e. Y = ΩKαH1−α. We set the scaling parameter equal to
Ω = 0.808, normalize the number of households to unity, H = 1, and set the capital share
in national income at α = 0.3. The pure rate of time preference is set at 4 percent per
annum, ρ = 0.04, and annual capital depreciation is equal to δ = 0.1. The rate of natural
regeneration is equal to µ = 0.05, and the remaining parameters of the ecological equation
(T1.8) are chosen such that plausible values for the elasticitities εG and εY are obtained. We
ﬁnd that φ = 12.605 and ξ = η = 6.464. Finally, we set β = 0.5, γ = 1 and assume that the
initial share of abatement equals ωG = 0.05. Using these values in Table 1, and solving for the
steady state yields: ˆ θ = 0.05, ˆ Y = 1, ˆ r = 0.04, ˆ C = 0.746, ˆ K = 2.036, and ˆ Q = 6.464, where
hats denote steady-state values. At this steady state, the environmental elasticities are equal
to εG = 0.05 and εY = 1, and ωQ = 0.866. The characteristic roots are real: λ1 = 0.212,
−λ2 = −0.171, and −λ3 = −0.051.
Figure 3 illustrates the adjustment paths for consumption, the capital stock, environmen-
tal quality, and the warm-glow tax following a ten percent increase in public abatement, from
G0 = 0.05 to G1 = 0.055. All paths are monotonic and qualitatively the same as under the
ﬂow interpretation. The warm-glow tax falls at impact because of the downward jump in
consumption. It continues to fall during transition because both output and environmental
quality increase.
13˜ C(t) ˜ K(t)





















































˜ Q(t) ˜ θ(t)



























































Figure 3: Transition Path for the Abatement Shock (increase in G)
1
44.2 Stronger warm-glow eﬀect
In this subsection we study the eﬀects of a stepwise increase in the warm-glow parameter, γ.
4.2.1 Flow interpretation
Under the ﬂow interpretation, the CE and KE lines are given by, respectively,
˜ C = −
δ12
δ11
˜ K − ωQ˜ γ, (27)
and:




An increase in γ shifts the CE curve down, say from CE0 to CE1 in Figure 4. The KE line is
unaﬀected because the shock does not aﬀect resources available for private consumption and
investment and for public abatement. At impact, the increase in γ gives rise to an upward
jump in consumption– the economy moves from E0 to point A on the new saddle path. At
point A, the interest rate exceeds the rate of time preference thus causing a downward sloping
time proﬁle for consumption along the saddle path. Intuitively, the shock leads to an increase
in the warm-glow tax, both because γ rises (direct eﬀect) and because consumption increases
(indirect eﬀect). Point A lies above the KE line, which implies that capital decumulation
takes place during transition. In the long run, both consumption and the capital are reduced,
and the environmental quality is increased.
4.2.2 Stock interpretation
In Figure 5 we illustrate the adjustment paths for the key variables following a ten percent
increase in the warm-glow parameter, from γ0 = 1 to γ1 = 1.1. The paths for consumption,

















Figure 4: Increase in the Warm-Glow Motive
16˜ C(t) ˜ K(t)


















































˜ Q(t) ˜ θ(t)























































Figure 5: Transition Path for the Warm-Glow Shock (increase in γ)
1
75 Concluding remarks
In this paper we explore the eﬀects of socially responsible investment and public abatement
on environmental quality and the economy. An important question we address is whether
environmental policy is eﬀective when consumers themselves have an incentive to (at least
partially) internalize the environmental externality due to a “warm glow” motive. We show
that socially responsible investment behaviour by households partially oﬀsets the positive
eﬀects on environmental quality of public abatement policies. The “warm glow” motive
results in socially responsible investment in the equity market. This in turn imposes an
implicit tax on the value of the polluting ﬁrm. Abatement policy reduces resources available
for consumption, which in turn lowers the implicit tax, leading to a larger capital stock and
higher pollution. As a consequence, the abatement policy is (partly) oﬀset via the implicit
tax mechanism.
18Appendix A: Household problem
The household optimization program constitutes a non-standard optimal control problem
which is solved by transforming it. The assets are perfect substitutes in the household portfolio
so that we can deﬁne total assets, a, as follows:
a = b + Pee. (A.1)
By diﬀerentiating both sides of (A.1) with respect to time we obtain:
˙ a = ˙ b + Pe˙ e + ˙ Pee. (A.2)
By adding ˙ Pee to both sides of (4) we obtain:
˙ a = W + d − z − c + rb + e ˙ Pe. (A.3)
By adding and deducting and rPee to the right-hand side of (A.3) and noting (5) we obtain:
˙ a = ra + W − z − c + (re − r)Pee, (A.4)
where re ≡ ˙ Pe/Pe + π. We now have a single aggregate state variable (a) whose dynamic
evolution must be determined.
The current-value Hamiltonian can be written as:
H ≡ lnc − β ln[1 + γ∗e] + ζ lnQ
+λ
 
ra + W − z − c + (re − r)Pee
 
+ µ[a − b − Pee],
where γ∗ ≡ γY/
  ¯ EQ
 
. The control variables are c, e, and b, the state variable is a, the


























˙ λ − ρλ = −
∂H
∂a
= −λr − µ. (A.8)
The felicity function, equation (A.2), implies that c is essential, i.e. the marginal felicity
of the ﬁrst inﬁnitesimal amount of consumption is inﬁnite, limc→0 ∂U/∂c = +∞ so that
consumption will always be strictly positive (c > 0). If some government bonds are held by
the household (b > 0), then it follows from (A.7) that µ = 0. As a result, by combining (A.5)
and (A.8) we obtain the Euler equation (6).
If some of the shares are also held (e > 0), then it follows from (A.5)-(A.6) that:








where V ≡ Pe ¯ E and v ≡ V/Y . This is equation (7) in the text. ￿
19Appendix B: Firm problem
By assumption, the ﬁrm ﬁnances its investment plans by retained earnings:
RE = I. (B.1)
By combining (10) and (B.1) and assuming that RE (t) > 0 we obtain the following expression
for dividends:
D = Π − I. (B.2)
The market value for outstanding shares is V = Pe ¯ E so, by diﬀerentiating with respect to
time, we obtain:
˙ V = ˙ Pe ¯ E. (B.3)













In its optimization plans, the ﬁrm takes the time path of θ as given. In equation (B.5), −θY
represents a negative dividend in the form of pollution that is undesirable to the household-
investors. By using (B.2)-(B.4) we obtain the fundamental diﬀerential equation for V :
˙ V = rV −
 
(1 − θ)F [K,L] − WL − I
 
. (B.6)
The key thing to note is that M-M still holds: dividends do not matter to the determination
of the value of the ﬁrm.
Clearly, since the coeﬃcient for V on the right-hand side of (B.6) is positive, equation
(B.6) is an unstable diﬀerential equation in V . The only economically sensible (no-bubble)











This yields equation (14) in the text.
It is easy to show that V (t) = K (t), i.e. θ does not inﬂuence the value of capital. The
term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (B.6) can be written as:
[ ] = (1 − θ)F [K,L] − WL − I
= (1 − θ)[FKK + FLL] − WL − ˙ K − δK
= [(1 − θ)FK − δ]K + [(1 − θ)FL − W]L − ˙ K
= rK − ˙ K, (B.8)
20where we have used (15)-(16). By using this result in (B.6) we immediately ﬁnd that V (t) =
K (t). ￿
Appendix C: Comparative dynamics





δ11 δ12 + αεY η13 η13
δ21 δ22 0




where δij are the typical elements of the ∆ matrix, and η13 ≡ αˆ yˆ θωQ. By multiplying the
third column by αεY and deducting the resulting column from the second column we obtain
for
   ¯ ∆
   :
   ¯ ∆




       
     
δ11 δ12 αεY η13
δ21 δ22 0
0 0 αεY
       
     
= −µ   |∆|, (C.2)

























For the ﬂow interpetation we have µ → ∞, so that the third column vanishes. In view of the

















 sI3 − ¯ ∆
 
  = (s + µ)Ψ(s) − αεY δ21η13s, (C.6)
where ¯ Λ(s) ≡ sI3 − ¯ ∆, Ψ(s) is the characteristic polynomial of ∆:













Figure C.1: Characteristic Roots
Denote the roots of ∆ by λ1 and −λ2. Clearly, the roots of ¯ ∆ are not s = −µ, and the roots
of ∆ (λ1 and −λ2). The roots of ∆ are implicitly deﬁned by:




Figure 5 depicts the location of the characteristic roots, assuming that the speed of adjustment
of nature is lower than the speed of adjustment in the economic subsystem. It is clear from
(C.7) that Ψ(s) is a parabola, featuring Ψ(s) = |∆| < 0 and roots that alternate in sign.
These roots, λ1 and −λ2, are located at points A in B in the ﬁgure. If η13 were zero (for
example, if ωQ = 0), then there would only be one-way interaction between the economy and
nature, as in Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998). The roots would simply be −¯ λ3 = −µ and the
roots of Ψ(s), i.e. λ1 and −λ2. Here however, we assume that η13 > 0 (because ωQ > 0)
so the economy aﬀects nature and vice versa. It is clear from (C.8) that Φ(s) is downward
sloping an features two branches–one in the third quadrant and one in the ﬁrst quadrant (the
horizontal and vertical asymptotes are at, respectively s = −µ and Φ(s) = αεY δ21η13 < 0.
In the ﬁgure we have drawn the case for which all roots are real: Ψ(s) intersects Φ(s) twice
in the third quadrant and once in the ﬁrst. For some parameter values, the intersection in
the third quadrant vanishes and the stable roots are complex conjugate, with negative real
parts.
22Long-run eﬀects





























δ12ˆ yωG + η13δ22εG
−δ11ˆ yωG − η13δ21εG
αεY δ11ˆ yωG + [αεY δ21η13 − |∆|]εG


   ˜ G (C.9)
Recall that |∆| = −λ1λ2.
Impact eﬀects














˜ C(0) − η13L{˜ γ,s}









(s − ¯ λ1)(s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)
adj¯ Λ(s), (C.11)
where adj¯ Λ(s) is the adjoint matrix of ¯ Λ(s). By pre-multiplying both sides of (C.10) by
¯ Λ(s)−1 and rearranging we obtain the following expression in Laplace transforms:











s − ¯ λ1




˜ C(0) − η13L{˜ γ,s}










(s + µ)(s − δ22) αεY η13s + δ12 (s + µ) η13 (s − δ22)
(s + µ)δ21 (s + µ)(s − δ11) η13δ21




The jump in ˜ C(0) is such that the right-hand side of (C.12) is of the 0 ÷ 0 type for the
unstable root, ¯ λ1. Using the second row of adj¯ Λ(s), for example, we get for s = ¯ λ1:
0 =




˜ C(0) − η13L{˜ γ, ¯ λ1}
 
−
 ¯ λ1 + µ
  ¯ λ1 − δ11
 
ˆ yωGL{ ˜ G, ¯ λ1}
+η13δ21µεGL{ ˜ G, ¯ λ1}. (C.14)
23Solving for ˜ C (0) we thus ﬁnd:
˜ C(0) = η13L{˜ γ, ¯ λ1} +
  ¯ λ1 + µ
  ¯ λ1 − δ11
 




L{ ˜ G, ¯ λ1}. (C.15)
For stepwise shocks we have that L{˜ γ,s} = ˜ γ/s and L{ ˜ G,s} = ˜ G/s, a result we impose from
here on.
Transitional dynamics
We can write the ﬁrst row of (C.12) as (s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)L{ ˜ C,s} = ΓC/
 
s − ¯ λ1
 
, with:
ΓC ≡ (s + µ)(s − δ22)
 
˜ C(0) − η13L{˜ γ,s}
 
− [αεY η13s + δ12 (s + µ)] ˆ yωGL{ ˜ G,s}
+η13 (s − δ22)µεGL{ ˜ G,s}. (C.16)
We also know that ˜ C (0) is such that:
0 ≡
 ¯ λ1 + µ
  ¯ λ1 − δ22
  




αεY η13¯ λ1 + δ12
 ¯ λ1 + µ
  
ˆ yωGL{ ˜ G, ¯ λ1}
+η13
 ¯ λ1 − δ22
 
µεGL{ ˜ G, ¯ λ1}. (C.17)
Lemma C.1 contains some useful results needed to simplify the expression for ΓC/
 
s − ¯ λ1
 
.
Lemma C.1 Deﬁne Ξ(s) ≡ s2 + ξ1s + ξ0. Then the following results can be obtained:
Ξ(s) − Ξ(x)
s − x







Proof: by straightforward substitutions. . ￿
After some straightforward manipulations we obtain:
ΓC
s − ¯ λ1
=
 
s + ¯ λ1 + µ − δ22
 
  ˜ C (0) −
s¯ λ1 + µδ22
s¯ λ1




  ˆ yωG ˜ G +
δ22
s¯ λ1
  η13µεG ˜ G. (C.18)
By substituting (C.18) into the expression for L{ ˜ C,s} we thus obtain:
L{ ˜ C,s} =
s + ¯ λ1 + µ − δ22
(s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)
  ˜ C (0) −
s¯ λ1 + µδ22





δ12ˆ yωG + δ22η13εG





To check, we use the initial-value and ﬁnal-value theorems of the Laplace transform to com-
pute, respectively, the impact and long-run eﬀects:
lim
s→∞sL{ ˜ C,s} = ˜ C (0) lim
s→∞
s2 +
 ¯ λ1 + µ − δ22
 
s
(s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)
= ˜ C (0), (C.20)
lim
s→0
sL{ ˜ C,s} = −
µδ22
¯ λ1¯ λ2¯ λ3
  η13˜ γ +





= ˜ C (∞). (C.21)
24It is easy to see that (C.21) coincides with the expression in (C.9)– the key thing to note is
that ¯ λ1¯ λ2¯ λ3 = −µ|∆|. Note that the term in front of (C.19) can be simpliﬁed by splitting it:
s + ¯ λ1 + µ − δ22
(s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)
=
1
s + ¯ λ2
+
¯ λ1 − ¯ λ3 + µ − δ22
(s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)
=
1
s + ¯ λ2
+
ρ + ¯ λ2 − δ22
(s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)
, (C.22)
where we have used the fact that ¯ λ1 − ¯ λ2 − ¯ λ3 = ρ − µ.
Using the same approach we ﬁnd that:
L{ ˜ K,s} =
δ21
(s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)
  ˜ C (0) +
1






s¯ λ1 + µδ11











L{ ˜ Q,s} = −
αεY












s¯ λ1 + λ1λ2 + αεY δ21η13





Equation (C.23) can be written in an alternative form by substituting the expression for ˜ C (0),
stated in (C.15), and simplifying:
L{ ˜ K,s} =
s + µ












¯ λ1 + s + µ





Glancing at (C.19) and (C.23)-(C.25), it is clear that there are only two types of Laplace
transforms for which we need to know the inverse. These inverses are covered in Lemma’s
C.2 and C.3.
Lemma C.2 Let −¯ λ2 and −¯ λ3 denote stable characteristics root. For the complex case, we
write these roots as −¯ λ2 ≡ −λ∗+θi and −¯ λ3 ≡ −λ∗−θi, where λ∗ > 0 and i is the imaginary
unit. Deﬁne the following Laplace transform:
L{T(t),s} ≡
1
(s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)
.
Then T(t) is a temporary transition term. (i) For real roots we obtain:
T(t) ≡
e−¯ λ2t − e−¯ λ3t
¯ λ3 − ¯ λ2
, (for ¯ λ2  = ¯ λ3)
≡ t   e−¯ λ2t, (for ¯ λ2 = ¯ λ3)




  e−λ∗t   sin(θt).
(iii) Properties: T(0) = 0 and limt→∞ T(t) = 0.
25Proof: Straightforward. For the complex case recall that e−¯ λ2t = e−λ∗t [cos(θt) + isin(θt)],
¯ λ3 − ¯ λ2 = 2θi, and e−¯ λ3t = e−λ∗t [cos(θt) − isin(θt)]. ￿
Lemma C.3 Let −¯ λ2 and −¯ λ3 denote stable characteristics root. For the complex case, we
write these roots as −¯ λ2 ≡ −λ∗−θi and −¯ λ3 ≡ −λ∗+θi, where λ∗ > 0 and i is the imaginary
unit. Deﬁne the following Laplace transform:
L{A(t),s} ≡
1
s(s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)
.








¯ λ3 − ¯ λ2
e−¯ λ2t +
¯ λ2
¯ λ3 − ¯ λ2
e−¯ λ3t
 






1 − e−¯ λ2t − ¯ λ2   t   e−¯ λ2t
 
, (for ¯ λ2 = ¯ λ3)




















Proof: First we state some useful results (for distinct roots):
1
s(s + ¯ λ2)(s + ¯ λ3)
=
1
¯ λ3 − ¯ λ2
 
1
s(s + ¯ λ2)
−
1



























L−1 { } =
1











1 − e−¯ λ3t
  
.
For the complex case we thus get:
L−1 { } =
1




















 ¯ λ3 − ¯ λ2
 
cos(θt) +






















where we have used ¯ λ3 − ¯ λ2 = 2θi, ¯ λ3 + ¯ λ2 = 2λ∗, ¯ λ2¯ λ3 = (λ∗)
2 + θ2 in the ﬁnal step. For
repeated real roots we can just use l’Hopitals Rule. ￿
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